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Sep - 20 - 2026 Download The Version
On 10 September 2026, the Houthi group succeeded in taking control of Mocha and its port, followed shortly thereafter by Dhubab, Mayyun Island, and the Hanish and Zugar islands. The Iran-backed armed group thus came to control the heart of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. Despite the shock these developments caused to the Yemen’ IRG and its ally, Saudi Arabia, they came after a series of field operations that began last August, when the Houthis targeted Mocha Port with dozens of missiles and drones and launched intensive attacks from several directions. The Houthi group announced that maritime navigation was safe, with the exception of Saudi vessels, and did not target any vessels transiting the Red Sea. However, the SEMC’s assessment of the Houthi group's conduct over the past two decades indicates that such temporary reassurances have never represented the end of a trajectory, but rather a prelude to raising the level of threats once the group's effective control becomes consolidated. The local population has paid a heavy price as a result of these developments. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded more than 104,000 displaced people from Taiz, Lahj, and Al Hudaydah since the beginning of September. Field surveys conducted by the SEMC indicate that the actual number exceeds 120,000 people, particularly as thousands of families have been accommodated in private homes and therefore do not appear in camp records. Meanwhile, around 3,800 people crossed the sea to Djibouti within three days. Fishermen lost their ability to fish, while economic activity fell to its lowest level as shops closed, transactions were forced to take place using the old currency, and numerous institutions were looted. Workers and owners of small and medium-sized enterprises were also affected, while Houthi authorities began imposing supervisors and collecting levies under the name of zakat obligations. The economic losses extend beyond the disruption of Mocha Port alone. Mocha, whose population has quadrupled since 2017 and which, according to the SEMC's estimate, attracted at least half a billion US dollars in real estate and service-sector investments, had been developing into an alternative outlet to Al Hudaydah and a gateway for exporting fish and red onions from Mawza', Al Khawkhah, and Al Wazi'iyah. The fall of Mocha to the Houthis poses challenges to the continuity of production, while also contributing to higher food prices in Taiz and Aden and depriving the national economy of a source of foreign currency. Overall, the repercussions will not be limited to an increase in insurance premiums to 1% of a vessel's value and Brent crude prices rising above $108 per barrel. They are likely to extend to the creation of a prolonged state of instability, particularly as the Houthi group approaches the interim capital of the Yemen’s IRG, Aden. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia finds itself facing pressure from two directions: in the east, the Strait of Hormuz is being closed, while in the west, the Houthi group is encircling its vessels; meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq are targeting East–West pipeline routes. Although there are no indications that Saudi Arabia intends to abandon its partnership with and support for the Yemen’ IRG, it faces a difficult challenge in managing the Yemen file, which has now begun to directly affect the Saudi's economy and its future. This is particularly significant as the Houthi group now controls a maritime corridor through which approximately 12% of international trade and 7% of global oil supplies pass, giving it the ability to cause a complete disruption, exercise selective control, or impose unofficial fees on vessels. The SEMC considers that the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is the consolidation of the group's control accompanied by temporary reassurances, amid governmental and regional shock and US reluctance to become involved. This would entail further displacement and an expansion of poverty and hunger. Even if de-escalation occurs, it would amount to little more than a temporary respite, during which the Houthi group would raise the ceiling of its demands and marginalize the Yemen’ IRG. A genuine path to peace can only be opened through the third scenario: the restoration of the coastline by Yemeni forces, supported by an international coalition capable of restoring the balance of power on the ground.
On 10 September 2026, the Houthi group succeeded in taking control of Mocha and its port, followed shortly thereafter by Dhubab, Mayyun Island, and the Hanish and Zugar islands. The Iran-backed armed group thus came to control the heart of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.
Despite the shock these developments caused to the Yemen’ IRG and its ally, Saudi Arabia, they came after a series of field operations that began last August, when the Houthis targeted Mocha Port with dozens of missiles and drones and launched intensive attacks from several directions.
The Houthi group announced that maritime navigation was safe, with the exception of Saudi vessels, and did not target any vessels transiting the Red Sea. However, the SEMC’s assessment of the Houthi group's conduct over the past two decades indicates that such temporary reassurances have never represented the end of a trajectory, but rather a prelude to raising the level of threats once the group's effective control becomes consolidated.
The local population has paid a heavy price as a result of these developments. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded more than 104,000 displaced people from Taiz, Lahj, and Al Hudaydah since the beginning of September. Field surveys conducted by the SEMC indicate that the actual number exceeds 120,000 people, particularly as thousands of families have been accommodated in private homes and therefore do not appear in camp records. Meanwhile, around 3,800 people crossed the sea to Djibouti within three days.
Fishermen lost their ability to fish, while economic activity fell to its lowest level as shops closed, transactions were forced to take place using the old currency, and numerous institutions were looted. Workers and owners of small and medium-sized enterprises were also affected, while Houthi authorities began imposing supervisors and collecting levies under the name of zakat obligations.
The economic losses extend beyond the disruption of Mocha Port alone. Mocha, whose population has quadrupled since 2017 and which, according to the SEMC's estimate, attracted at least half a billion US dollars in real estate and service-sector investments, had been developing into an alternative outlet to Al Hudaydah and a gateway for exporting fish and red onions from Mawza', Al Khawkhah, and Al Wazi'iyah. The fall of Mocha to the Houthis poses challenges to the continuity of production, while also contributing to higher food prices in Taiz and Aden and depriving the national economy of a source of foreign currency.
Overall, the repercussions will not be limited to an increase in insurance premiums to 1% of a vessel's value and Brent crude prices rising above $108 per barrel. They are likely to extend to the creation of a prolonged state of instability, particularly as the Houthi group approaches the interim capital of the Yemen’s IRG, Aden.
At the regional level, Saudi Arabia finds itself facing pressure from two directions: in the east, the Strait of Hormuz is being closed, while in the west, the Houthi group is encircling its vessels; meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq are targeting East–West pipeline routes. Although there are no indications that Saudi Arabia intends to abandon its partnership with and support for the Yemen’ IRG, it faces a difficult challenge in managing the Yemen file, which has now begun to directly affect the Saudi's economy and its future. This is particularly significant as the Houthi group now controls a maritime corridor through which approximately 12% of international trade and 7% of global oil supplies pass, giving it the ability to cause a complete disruption, exercise selective control, or impose unofficial fees on vessels.
The SEMC considers that the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is the consolidation of the group's control accompanied by temporary reassurances, amid governmental and regional shock and US reluctance to become involved. This would entail further displacement and an expansion of poverty and hunger. Even if de-escalation occurs, it would amount to little more than a temporary respite, during which the Houthi group would raise the ceiling of its demands and marginalize the Yemen’ IRG.
A genuine path to peace can only be opened through the third scenario: the restoration of the coastline by Yemeni forces, supported by an international coalition capable of restoring the balance of power on the ground.